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JURISDICTIONAL REMIX: THE FEDERAL COURTS
JURISDICTION AND VENUE CLARIFICATION ACT
PRESENTS NEW CHALLENGES TO FEDERAL LITIGATION
ABSTRACT
In response to a growing concern about the efficiency and clarity of
jurisdiction in the federal judicial code, Congress passed the Federal Courts
Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act (“JVCA”) on November 30, 2011.
The JVCA is the most far-reaching package of revisions to the judicial code
since the Jurisdictional Improvements Act of 1990. Although the JVCA
affects almost every aspect of federal jurisdiction, the majority of the
amendments focus primarily on removal and venue. The new amendments
resolve circuit splits, carve out new exceptions, and codify judicially
created rules to “bring more clarity to the operation of Federal jurisdictional
statutes and facilitate the identification of the appropriate State or Federal
court where actions should be brought.” While the stated purpose of the
JVCA is to bring guidelines and clarity to often confusing jurisdictional
issues, there is concern the JVCA will create new challenges and confusion
for future federal litigants. This Note will examine the new jurisdictional
amendments created by the JVCA, and will argue the JVCA was intended
to clarify jurisdiction, but the JVCA may present future federal litigants
with more questions than answers.
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INTRODUCTION

On December 7, 2011, President Barack Obama signed into law one of
the most expansive pieces of legislation affecting the United States judicial
code since the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.1 The Federal Courts
Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 20112 (“JVCA”), was passed in
response to an increased demand for clarification of federal jurisdiction.
Although the JVCA affects almost every aspect of federal jurisdiction, the
majority of the amendments focus primarily on removal and venue. The
new amendments resolve circuit splits, carve out new exceptions, and
codify judicially created rules to “bring more clarity to the operation of
Federal jurisdictional statutes and facilitate the identification of the
appropriate State or Federal court where actions should be brought.”3
1. Arthur Hellman, The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act is Now
Law, JURIST (Dec. 30, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/12/arthur-hellman-jvca.php.
2. Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63,
§103(b)(3)(A), 125 Stat. 758 (enacted Dec. 7, 2011).
3. H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 1-2 (2011).
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While the stated purpose of the JVCA is to bring guidelines and clarity to
often confusing jurisdictional issues, there is concern the JVCA will create
new challenges and confusion for future federal litigants.
This Note will explore the JVCA in depth and discuss how the new
amendments may impact federal litigants. Specifically, Part II will address
the lengthy and complex legislative history of the JVCA, including the
development of the bill and its passage through Congress. Part III will
address the key amendments of the JVCA, including timely removal,
amount in controversy, and venue clarification. Finally, Part IV will
discuss the challenges presented by these new provisions, and the new
strategy concerns the JVCA presents for federal litigators.
II. A CALL FOR CLARITY IN FEDERAL JURISDICTION
In the 1990s, the Judicial Conference Committee on Federal-State
jurisdiction began to identify recurring problems encountered by litigants
and judges.4 The Judicial Conference Committee consulted with law
professors, the American Law Institute (“ALI”), and the legal community to
hone in on the particular areas of jurisdiction that required clarification.5 In
particular, judges raised concerns about the increasing confusion they faced
when applying certain jurisdiction and venue statutes.6
A. JURISDICTION AND EFFICIENCY
Judges, law professors, and the ALI raised concerns on the vagueness
and confusing procedural limitations of the federal judicial code.7 As a
result, several jurisdictional issues, including defendant removal and venue,
were resolved differently across the Circuit Courts of Appeals.8 A specific
example of this confusion surrounded the singular use of “the defendant” in
former 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b); nothing in the legislative history discussed the
significance of the singular use of “the defendant,” but the ambiguity gave
rise to a split in interpretation by the federal circuit courts.9

4. The Third Branch, Long-Awaited Act Clarifies Venue and Jurisdiction (Dec. 2011),
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/11-12-01/LongAwaited_Act_Clarifies_Venue_and_Jurisdiction.aspx.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Paul E. Lund, The Timeliness of Removal and Multiple-Defendant Lawsuits, 64 BAYLOR
L. REV. 50, 64 (2012).
8. Id. at 52.
9. Id. at 60.
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In the spirit of addressing the issue of efficiency and clarity, the ALI
began the Federal Judicial Code Revision Project.10 Finalized in 2001, the
Federal Judicial Code Revision Project was one of the primary influences
on the JVCA and spurred the discussion for drafting the JVCA.11 Around
2001, the federal Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction began its own
initiative “to ascertain amendments for judicial improvements.”12
B. A PROPORTIONAL RESPONSE: THE JURISDICTION
AND VENUE CLARIFICATION ACT
Charged with legislating a response to the growing concerns with
federal court jurisdiction and efficiency, the Committee on Federal-State
Jurisdiction began drafting several proposals for consideration.13
Ultimately, the Committee recommended seven specific amendments to
Title 28 “to improve the clarity of the law and increase judicial
efficiency.”14
1. Preliminary Legislation by the Committee on FederalState Jurisdiction
One of the seven initial proposals related to citizenship of insurers in
direct-action litigation.15 The remaining six proposals related to removal
and remand procedures.16 In addition to a last-served defendant proposal,
to resolve the circuit spilt discussed above, these proposals included: (1)
how to address removal issues in diversity cases when the amount in
controversy was unclear; (2) authorizing federal district courts to waive the
one-year limit on removal in some circumstances; (3) clarified 28 U.S.C.
§1441(c) regarding the removal and remand of cases containing both
federal-law claims and unrelated state-law claims; (4) separating the
removal provisions for criminal and civil cases into two statutes; and (5)
removal of the specific reference to Rule 11 in 28 U.S.C. §1446(a).17
In 2005, the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Property of the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing on these

10. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Federal Judicial Code Revision Project (2001),
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.ppage&node_id=78.
11. Id.
12. Lund, supra note 7, at 98 (quoting AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION
PROJECT § 1446(b)(1), 459 (2004)).
13. Id. at 99.
14. Id. at 98-99 (quoting Judicial Conference Report, Sept. 23, 2003, at 22-23).
15. See Judicial Conference Report, Sept. 23, 2003, at 22-23.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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proposals.18 Subcommittee Chair Lamar Smith of Texas stated that these
proposals would have “a wide impact on ordinary private litigations in the
federal courts.”19 Smith also noted, “our job is not to favor plaintiffs or
defendants, but to make sure that the jurisdiction arrangements are both fair
and efficient for all litigants.”20
2.

Consultation with Legal Stakeholders

While Chairman Smith and the subcommittee considered these
proposals, several legal scholars consulted and testified to the project during
the 111th Congress. Scholars from law schools such as the University of
Houston, Chicago-Kent, Loyola, and Duke endorsed the changes.21
Professor Arthur Hellman of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law
testified before the Subcommittee and contributed significantly to the
project.22
Other legal stakeholders were also consulted during the drafting of the
JVCA. The American Bar Association and the American Association for
Justice spoke to the amount in controversy requirements, removal, and
transfer of venue provisions.23 Lawyers for Civil Justice and the Federal
Bar Association also pledged general support for the bill.24 Most
importantly, this informal vetting process with legal stakeholders allowed
the JVCA to mark up the bill, increasing the likelihood the JVCA could be
passed by both the House and the Senate.
3.

Congressional Candor and Bargaining

In 2006, the bill was introduced containing the proposals by the
Subcommittee;25 however, the bill was not reported out of committee.26
The bill did not reappear until November 2009.27 It returned as House Bill
4113, entitled the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act
in the 111th Congress.28

18. Lund, supra note 7, at 99.
19. Id.
20. See Federal Courts Jurisdiction Clarification Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (Nov. 15,
2005) (statement of Rep. Smith, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
21. H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 2.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Lund, supra note 7, at 101.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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The House passed the bill by voice vote on September 28, 2010.29
Upon review by the Senate Judiciary Committee, some minor amendments
were made to the House version of the bill.30 One of the more controversial
strikes made by the Senate was to maintain the status quo on derivative
jurisdiction.31 Prior to 1986, the derivative jurisdiction doctrine meant that
if a state court lacked jurisdiction over an exclusively federal matter,
removal to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(f) was nonetheless barred
because the Unites States district court’s jurisdiction was not “derivative”
of the jurisdiction that attached in state court.32 The Department of Justice
attorneys said that although it is infrequently used, they sometimes invoke
the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction when suits involving federal officers
and agencies are removed to federal court.33
4.

Passage of the JVCA

With the Senate changes, the bill was reintroduced in January 2011 as
House Bill 394.34 The bill quickly passed the House, unanimously
supported on February 28, 2011.35 The final version of the JVCA passed
the Senate on November 30, 2011, and was signed by President Obama on
December 7, 2011.36
III. REMOVAL AND VENUE: THE KEY AMENDMENTS
After taking six years to pass through Congress, the JVCA was a
significant accomplishment for the House Judiciary Committee and the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts. The JVCA included
several amendments to Title 28 of the judicial code.37 The most significant
amendments for federal litigants are: (1) timely removal for multiple
defendants; (2) amount in controversy requirements; and (3) clarification of
federal venue selection.

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. H.R. REP., supra note 3.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, H.R. 394, 112th Cong.
(as introduced in House, Jan. 24, 2011).
35. Lund, supra note 7, at 102.
36. Id.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2011).

2013]

NOTE

169

A. TIMELY REMOVAL FOR MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS
The United States Constitution makes no explicit reference to removal
of cases from state to federal court; however, ever since the federal courts
were first created, Congress has provided for removal.38 The theory
underlying removal is that when a case properly falls within the federal
courts’ limited jurisdiction, the defendant should have the opportunity to
consider the benefits of federal jurisdiction, as the plaintiff(s) had the first
opportunity to determine where to file suit.39
Usually, the statutory right to remove exists when the plaintiff(s) could
have brought their suit in federal court.40 The suit is one that would have
fallen within the original jurisdiction of the federal court, but the plaintiff
chose to file in state court instead. This normally involves cases where the
plaintiffs have asserted claims that arise under federal law or diversity of
citizenship exists between plaintiffs and defendants.41
Removal remains a major point of controversy for several reasons.
First, removal disrupts the usual rule that the plaintiff gets to choose the
forum in which the plaintiff’s claims will be heard.42 Second, removal
involves taking a case from the state court’s hands even though the state
court had entirely proper jurisdiction over the case.43 Third, removal creates
the potential of upsetting the state court’s proceedings after the court has
devoted substantial time and attention to the case.44
1. The Problem: A Circuit Spilt on Section 1446(b) and Removal
for Multiple Defendants
Prior to the enactment of the JCVA, the time limitation on removal for
cases involving multiple defendants was a significant procedural limitation.
The limitation, before the recent amendment was found in the first
paragraph of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b):
The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed
within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through
service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth
the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based,
or within thirty days after the service of summons upon the
38. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §5.5, at 354 (5th ed. 2007)
(discussing Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §12, 1 Stat. 73, 79-80).
39. Lund, supra note 7, at 56.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 58.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is
not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is
shorter.45
Former section 1446(b) was the only removal statute to refer to the
defendant in the singular.46 The statute was simple enough to apply when
all defendants were served on the same date, but ambiguity arose in the
common situation of service on different dates. It is this ambiguity that had
given rise to a split among the circuit courts.47
Because of the reference to the defendant in the singular, three different
circuit court approaches were developed.48 First, the most stringent
interpretation was the Fifth Circuit’s “first-served” defendant rule.49 This
rule requires all defendants who have been served at that point to file or join
in a removal notice within thirty days of service on the first defendant.50
Second, several circuits, concerned about the possibility of “inequitable
results” with the first-served defendant rule, adopted the “last-served”
defendant rule.51 Under this rule, removal is timely as long as the removal
notice is filed and joined in by all defendants within thirty days of service
on the last-served defendant.52
Finally, the Fourth Circuit adopted an “intermediate” rule between the
two, polar-opposite rules in the other circuits.53 The Fourth Circuit’s
approach bears some resemblance to the first-served defendant rule, in that
it requires that a notice of removal be filed within thirty days of service on
the first-served defendant.54 If the first-served defendant does not file a
notice, the case cannot be removed.55 However, the intermediate rule does
provide some relief to later-served defendants.56 If a timely notice of
removal has been filed by the first-served defendant, the subsequently
served defendants do not need to join with notice within the initial thirtyday period; instead, each defendant has thirty days from the date of service
to file its own notice of removal or join in a previously filed notice.57

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006).
Howard B. Stravitz, Re-cocking the Removal Trigger, 53 S.C. L. REV. 185, 200 (2002).
Id.
Lund, supra note 7, at 64.
Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 69-70.
Id. at 69.
See McKinney v. Board of Trustees, 955 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1992).
Lund, supra note 7, at 77.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Solution: The Last-Served Defendant Rule

The JVCA specifically addresses this conflict among the circuit courts.
First, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) previously consisted of two, unnumbered
paragraphs. The JVCA preserves the current language of the first paragraph
as new subsection (b)(1).58 The language previously found in the second
paragraph of section 1446(b), with some changes, has been renumbered as
subsection (b)(3);59 the new subsection will govern the timing of removal of
cases that are not removable as originally filed but become removable later.
Between those two subsections, an entirely new subsection (b)(2) has been
added to address multiple-defendant cases.60
Second, the JVCA expressly adopts the last-served defendant rule.61 If
any defendant elects to file a notice of removal, the previously served
defendants can join, even if they previously made a conscious decision not
to seek removal.62 Finally, the JVCA purports that the last-served
defendant rule is necessitated by considerations of “[f]airness to laterserved defendants” and that it would “not allow an indefinite period for
removal.”63 The question remains, however, whether these revisions have
actually resulted in more ambiguity and inefficiency.
B. AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY
From the earliest days of the federal courts, there has been a statutory
requirement applicable to some cases that a certain amount is in controversy
in order to bring an action in the federal district courts. In most diversity
cases, the amount in controversy is governed by the more than $75,000
requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 1332.64 The problem often encountered by
federal judges and litigants is how to calculate the proper amount in
controversy because the rules for measurement are complex. Additionally,
federal courts take various views and opinions on how to calculate the
amount in controversy.65

58. Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, §
103(b)(3)(A), 125 Stat. 758 (enacted Dec. 7, 2011).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 13-14.
62. Id. at 14.
63. Id.
64. 14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3701 (4th ed. 2011).
65. Id.
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The Problem: Mixed Calculations

Mississippi Railroad Company v. Ward66 is the leading United State
Supreme Court precedent supporting the plaintiff-viewpoint rule.67 The
plaintiff-viewpoint rule can be warranted in terms of the long-standing
principle that the burden of establishing the subject matter jurisdiction of a
federal court is on the plaintiff, and the plaintiff must do so in the
complaint.68 Testing the adequacy of the amount in controversy from the
perspective of the plaintiff’s viewpoint can be efficient and can promote a
straight-forward approach in terms of deciding the jurisdictional amount
question.
However, cases are never this clear and simple, particularly when
assessing damages.69 A significant number of other lower federal courts, on
the other hand, have found that jurisdiction exists if more than the statutory
amount is involved from the viewpoint of either the plaintiff or the
defendant.70 There is also a third viewpoint on the amount in controversy
calculation, supported by several district court decisions and a dictum by
one court of appeals.71 These cases view the amount in controversy from
the point of view of the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction, and as
such, would look to the plaintiff’s viewpoint in a case within the federal
courts’ original jurisdiction, and to the defendant’s viewpoint in a case
brought to the federal courts by way of removal from a state court.72
2.

The Solution: Defining the Equation

Because of these various interpretations of how to calculate the amount
in controversy, one of the amendments included in the JVCA directly
addressed this issue. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 was amended by the JVCA by
adding new sections related to the calculation of the amount in controversy
when local statutes do not require or allow the plaintiff to allege damages
66. 67 U.S. 485 (1862).
67. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 64, § 3703.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969) (dictum), Sasenbury v.
Barnes-Jewish Hosp., 2010 WL 1912913, *2 (S.D. Ill. 2010) (quoting Smart v. Local Int’l
Brotherhood of Elect. Workers, 562 F.3d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 2009)). “When a defendant removes
an action where a plaintiff had sought to recover some ‘unspecified amount that is not selfevidently greater or less than the federal amount-in-controversy requirement,’ the Sixth Circuit
has held that the removing defendant must show that the action ‘more likely than not’ satisfies the
$75,000 requirement.” Cleveland Housing Renewal Project v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co., 606 F.
Supp. 2d 698, 710 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (quoting Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 158 (6th
Cir. 1993)).
72. Id.
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over a threshold amount.73 The new 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2) allows a
defendant, in the notice of removal, to assert that the actual or true amount
in controversy exceeds $75,000, even if the plaintiff’s pleadings are silent
on the issue.74 If the district judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum, federal
In addition, under 28 U.S.C. §
court jurisdiction will apply.75
1446(c)(3)(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), if a defendant later finds that the
amount in controversy is greater than $75,000 because of discovery or an
amended pleading, a new thirty day window for removal will open.76 The
result is a hybrid approach between the current methods of calculations for
amount in controversy.
The legislative history encourages looking to McPhail v. Deere &
Company,77 and Meridian Security Insurance Company v. Sadowski,78 for
the appropriate application of what must be pled or alleged in order to reach
the jurisdictional threshold. In addition, removal to federal court can
happen more than one year after the action was filed if the plaintiff acted in
bad faith by attempting to disguise the true amount of damages claimed.79
The new amount in controversy requirements allows the defendant to
assert his own assessment of the amount in controversy only if state
practice “does not permit demand for a specific sum or permits recovery of
damages in excess of the amount demanded.”80 When state law is
permissive, and the plaintiff does not name a dollar figure, neither provision
is triggered: state law does “permit” specific demands, and there is no
“amount demanded.”81 Unfortunately, there are many states whose practice
falls into this category.
The defendant is permitted to assert his own amount in controversy,
and the statute adopts a “preponderance of the evidence” standard.82 Some
courts treat the preponderance standard as if it articulated a presumption of
narrow construction against removal jurisdiction.83 McPhail and Meridian
73. William Baude, Clarification Needed: Fixing the Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification
Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 33, 34 (2012).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)-(c) (2011).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 529 F.3d 947 (10th Cir. 2008).
78. 411 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 2006).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(3)(B) (2011).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(A)(ii) (2011) (emphasis added).
81. Id.
82. Baude, supra note 73, at 35.
83. See, e.g., Menendez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 364 F. App'x 62, 65 (5th Cir. 2010),
Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 158 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Meridian v. Sadowski, 441
F.3d 536, 542 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting other district courts that had imposed such a burden).
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analyzed that view, and instead interpreted the standard to apply only to
“contested facts” that might be relevant to the amount in controversy,
whereas “once those underlying facts are proven, a defendant . . . is entitled
to stay in federal court unless it is ‘legally certain’ that less than $75,000 is
at stake.”84 The Committee Report does suggest the bill was intended to
codify the rule in McPhail and Meridian, but that intention is expressed
only in the Committee Report.85
C. CLARIFYING VENUE
The JVCA also addressed issues of venue. Venue refers to location;
the place where a lawsuit should be filed and heard according to the
applicable statutes or rules.86 As courts have observed, the fundamental
aspect of venue is “primarily a matter of choosing a convenient forum.”87
The principal focus of a venue inquiry is the “convenience of litigants and
witnesses,” although it is more concerned with the litigant who has not
chosen the forum than with the litigant who has chosen the forum.88
1.

The Problem: Where Do Claims Belong?

Although venue may appear to be one of the more clear topics in
federal jurisdiction, it is one of the more complex portions of the federal
judicial code. The word “convenience” alone is enough to muddy the
jurisdictional waters on venue. Other problems arise with fraudulent
joinder and forum shopping among parties.89
While complex, venue is also an absolutely critical aspect of litigation.
Venue can have a major impact on court costs, time to trial, and the
attitudes of the judge handling the case.90 As such, venue is a crucial
component in federal cases.
Prior to 1990, venue for certain civil claims was permitted in the
primary judicial district in which the claim arose.91 This language created
difficulties for the lower federal courts because they struggled with exactly
how to establish the single judicial district in which the claim arose.92 With
84. McPhail, 529 F.3d at 954; accord Meridian, 441 F.3d at 543.
85. Baude, supra note 73, at 36.
86. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 64, § 3801.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Li Zhu, Taking Off: Recent Changes to Venue Transfer of Patent Litigation in the Rocket
Docket, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 901, 904 (2010).
91. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 64, § 3804.
92. Mitchell G. Page, After the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990: Does the General Venue
Statute Survive as a Protection for Defendants?, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1153, 1155 (2003).
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the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, however, the general venue statute
was amended to authorize venue in any district in which a “substantial part
of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.”93 In drafting
this amendment to the federal venue statute, Congress meant to eliminate
“wasteful litigation” concomitant with ascertaining the single district “in
which the claim arose.”94
Notwithstanding the intent of Congress to curtail litigation over venue,
the 1990 Act truncated the ability of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 to protect a
defendant from having to defend a claim brought in an unfair or
inconvenient district.95 As a result of the 1990 Act, Congress created a
situation where plaintiffs in diversity cases used the amended language of
28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2) to influence the law applied to resolve their claim.96
This consequence went beyond Congress’ stated intent of trying to decrease
litigation over venue.97 Moreover, this result also ran against the general
judicial doctrine and statutory provisions that seek to discourage forum
shopping for the ideal court to try a case.98
2.

The Solution: A Unitary Approach

One of the more significant amendments by the JVCA included
changing the general definition of venue to help clarify some of the
confusion created by the 1990 Act.99 In the revised 28 U.S.C. § 1390(a),
venue now distinguishes the geographic specification of the appropriate
forum from other federal law provisions, which restrict subject-matter
jurisdiction.100
The amendment also abolished the distinction in venue between “local”
and “transitory” actions.101 The local action rule had limited certain kinds
of actions involving real property to the district where the property was
located. This created problems in quarrels over property suits if a court
could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the place
where the property was located.102 Changes to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2)

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Hellman, supra note 1.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2011).
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clarify that only subject matter and personal jurisdiction restrictions apply
and repeals 28 U.S.C. § 1392.103
The JVCA amendments were also designed to eliminate the distinction
between diversity and federal question action venue to a “unitary”
approach.104 It establishes, regardless of how subject-matter jurisdiction is
obtained, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 as the general venue statute. Venue is based on
residence of the defendant, and fallback venue can be used if there is no
other district in which the case may be brought.105
The new fallback provision directs that venue for both diversity and
federal question matters fall on the district “in which any defendant is
subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.”106
The new subsection of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1) also clarifies that “resides”
should have the same meaning as domicile, and a natural person is deemed
to reside in the judicial district where they are domiciled.107 Additionally,
the JVCA allows for transfer of venue to any district, with the consent of all
parties.108 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) had previously only permitted transfer to a
venue where the action could be brought; those types of transfers are
possible when all parties agree and the court determines it is for the
convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice.109
IV. CLARIFYING THE CLARIFICATION: NEW CONCERNS FOR
FEDERAL LITIGANTS
Although the JVCA was passed by Congress to address the growing
confusion and frustration with parts of the federal judicial code, the
question remains as to whether the JVCA actually provides clarification to
federal judges and litigants. There is also concern the JVCA will create
new ambiguities and questions in the federal judicial code. Omitted
provisions, ambiguity, and new strategy issues are only a handful of the
concerns raised by the JVCA.
A. PLAYING POLITICS: OMITTED PROVISIONS
As referenced earlier, when the JVCA was being vetted in Congress, a
critical part of the process included consulting with critical legal
stakeholders in the process, including federal judges and respected legal
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1392 (2011).
Hellman, supra note 1.
28 U.S.C. § 1391.
Id.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2011).
Id.
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professionals. While on its face the legislative process appeared to be a
showing of due diligence and bipartisanship by Congress, the political
process still removed several controversial provisions from the JVCA.110
Two controversial provisions in particular were removed from the
JVCA. The first would have allowed a plaintiff to avoid removal based on
diversity by filing a “declaration” reducing the amount in controversy
below the minimum specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).111 This provision
was appealing because it offered a way of avoiding satellite litigation,
which increases litigation costs in cases where the amount at stake is
relatively small by the modern standard.112
The second controversial provision cut from the JVCA focused on
“derivative jurisdiction.”113 Several years ago, the United States Supreme
Court articulated a rule that the jurisdiction of a district court on removal is
“derivative:” if the state court from which a case was removed had no
jurisdiction, the federal court also lacked jurisdiction.114 Essentially, this
meant if a defendant removed a case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal courts, the district court is required to remand the case to the state
court.115 This rule was revoked by Congress, and the current version of the
abrogation statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(f), is limited to removals under the
general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).116 Other removals however
are still governed by the derivative jurisdiction rule.
When the JVCA was introduced, it included a provision repealing the
derivative jurisdiction rule for all removal cases, which appeared to be a
welcomed change by federal litigators.117 However, the derivative
jurisdiction rule was jettisoned from the bill, when the Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) objected to its presence.118 Derivative jurisdiction is
sometimes invoked by the DOJ when suits involving federal officers and
agencies are removed to federal court.119 As such, the DOJ did not want to
abolish derivative jurisdiction and opposition by DOJ would have stopped
the bill in its tracks.120

110. Arthur Hellman, The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act: Some
Missing Pieces, JURIST (Jan. 4, 2012), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/01/arthur-hellman-jvca-ii.php.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(f) (2011).
117. Hellman, supra note 110.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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The vetting process for the JVCA had some successes and some
unfortunate losses of controversial provisions; if these controversial
provisions were to have been included, it is likely the JVCA would not have
been passed. However, as the stated intent behind the JVCA was to provide
clarity to federal jurisdiction, it is noteworthy that in an effort to promote
clarity, the often-unclear political process still ruled the day.
B. VENUE AND AMBIGUITY
One of the more significant amendments to the JVCA was on venue.
Partly in response to the confusion created by the 1990 Act, the JVCA
looked to create a unitary approach to venue to help eliminate problems
with forum-shopping and fraudulent joinder.121 Most of the amendments to
venue have been seen as positive changes, but some ambiguities still
remain.
It is possible that the new amendments may create a greater incentive
to litigate issues of venue, particularly for complex litigation cases. 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b) now states venue is proper if civil action is brought in:
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all
defendants are residents of the State in which the district is
located, or (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of property that is the subject of the action, or (3) if
there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought,
any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s
personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.122
These provisions, however, are prime provisions to be tested by
litigation. The “substantial part of the events or omissions” language
provides much discretion to the parties to decide venue. At first, this may
seem attractive to litigators; however, this discretion creates an opportunity
for creativity. The new venue provisions may actually increase the amount
of forum shopping particular litigants can do in a given case, and as a result,
future federal litigants will need to carefully consider how to use these new
venue provisions to their advantage.
C. NEW STRATEGY CONCERNS FOR FEDERAL LITIGANTS
The JVCA also presented new strategy concerns for federal litigants.
Although the JVCA resolves some conflicts in the lower courts, the

121. See H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 17-20.
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (Supp. 2012).

2013]

NOTE

179

statute’s approach is less than ideal. It is always complicated to
superimpose a handful of statutory procedures on a complex network of
When dealing with
rules established through court decisions.123
jurisdictional matters, an added challenge exists in developing procedures
that will integrate smoothly with the great diversity of practices and
procedures adopted by state systems for asserting and valuing claims.124
No matter the subject area or party represented, changes will require all
federal practice litigators to reconsider longstanding litigation strategies.125
Specifically, federal litigation strategy for federal defendants will require
creative and innovative approaches under the JVCA. Under the JVCA, any
newly added defendant has its own thirty-day time period to seek
removal.126 This does away with plaintiffs in some circuits simply serving
other defendants in complex litigation cases well after the first defendant in
an attempt to run the thirty days, thus keeping the case in state court.127 The
JVCA made significant changes litigators will want to utilize to best
represent their clients; however, defendants should have easier access to
federal courts.128
V. CONCLUSION
The JVCA, after almost a decade of discussion and debate, has
presented some of the most expansive revisions to the judicial code since
1990. It has been touted by some scholars as one of the more “real”
accomplishments by Congress; however, the JVCA is not without
imperfections. Judge Cardozo once said, “[T]he legislature, informed only
casually and intermittently of the needs and problems of the courts, without
expert or responsible or disinterested or systematic advice . . . patches the
fabric here and there, and mars often when it would mend.”129 The JVCA,
by contrast, was prepared with extensive expert advice and makes some
definite progress.
Even experts, however, are subject to political
130
compromise.
The provisions of the JVCA that Congress ultimately adopted are the
best that can be produced under the limitations of the political process.
Because controversial proposals are dead in the water when placed in
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legislation, it is much easier to remove the provisions than find a way to
modify the provisions and incorporate them into the legislation.131 Yet, at
what cost is the political process confusing, instead of clarifying, federal
jurisdiction? Perhaps it is time to embrace some more controversial
reforms to restore efficiency and clarity to the federal courts and federal
court jurisdiction.
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